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Interlocutory Appeal of Preindictment Suppression Motions 
Under Rule 41(e) 
Under rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,1 a 
defendant may move to block the government's use of illegally seized 
evidence.2 Rule 41(e) motions request both the return of the seized 
property and the prohibition of its use as evidence at trial. 3 While rule 
41(e) grants the federal district courts the authority to hear these mo-
tions in the first instance, 4 whether a movant may immediately appeal 
these rulings is less clear. 
One such area of uncertainty surrounds the immediate appealabil-
ity of a ruling on a 41(e) motion in a case where seized evidence has 
been presented to a grand jury, but where no formal criminal proceed-
ing is pending against the movant at the time the motion is denied. 5 
1. Rule 41(e) reads, in pertinent part: 
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district court for 
the district in which the property was seized for the return of the property on the ground 
that he is entitled to lawful possession of the property which was illegally seized. The judge 
shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion. If the 
motion is granted the property shall be restored and it shall not be admissible in evidence at 
any hearing or trial. 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e). 
2. The protection granted by rule 41(e) parallels, but does not expand upon, that guaranteed 
by the exclusionary rule. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 n.6 (1974); Alderman 
v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 173 n.6 (1969); United States v. The Residence of Nicholas 
Furina, 707 F.2d 82, 83 n.4 (3d Cir. 1983). See also notes 69-72 infra and accompanying text. 
3. See note 1 supra; see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Young), 716 F.2d 493, 495 (8th 
Cir. 1983); Standard Drywall, Inc. v. United States, 668 F.2d 156, 158 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 456 
U.S. 927 (1982); Imperial Distribs., Inc. v. United States, 617 F.2d 892, 895 (1st Cir.), cert 
denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980); United States v. One Residence & Attached Garage, 603 F.2d 1231, 
1238-39 (7th Cir. 1979) (Wood, J., dissenting); United States v. Merchant Diamond Group, Inc., 
565 F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir. 1977). 
4. Such motions are cognizable even before a movant has been indicted. See, e.g., Go-Bart 
Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 355 (1931) (precedent supports district court juris-
diction of preindictment evidentiary motions); Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 29, 34 (5th Cir. 
1974) (same), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975); Lord v. Kelley, 223 F. Supp. 684, 687-88 (D. 
Mass. 1963) (same), appeal dismissed, 334 F.2d 742 (1st Cir. 1964), cert denied, 379 U.S. 961 
(1965). 
One district court has recently denied that it has jurisdiction to hear preindictment motions 
under rule 41(e). United States v. Mid-States Exchange, 620 F. Supp. 358, 359 (D.S.D. 1985) 
(holding that the court "simply does not have the power to suppress or return evidence which is 
the subject of a current grand jury investigation"). Such a ruling, however, ignores the Supreme 
Court's language in Go-Bart, 282 U.S. at 355, which allows district courts to hear preindictment 
evidentiary motions while evidence is in the possession of a United States Commissioner. Mid-
States' holding is also highly questionable in light of Eighth Circuit precedent. In In re Grand 
Jury Proceedings (Young), 716 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1983), the court explicitly decided the issue of 
the appealability of preindictment 41(e) motions without even questioning the district court's 
jurisdiction to hear the original motion. See also notes 6-7 infra (cases from other circuits mak-
ing the same implicit recognition). 
5. This Note, therefore, does not address the appealability of 41(e) motions made prior to the 
empaneling of a grand jury. 
1755 
1756 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:1755 
Six federal courts of appeals refuse to hear such appeals, arguing that 
the force of precedent and policy precludes interlocutory review of 
preindictment orders concerning 41(e) motions.6 On the other hand, 
four circuits allow immediate appeals in these cases. 7 
This Note argues that preindictment rulings denying8 41(e) mo-
tions are not immediately appealable. Part I discusses decisions that 
mandate dismissal of such appeals for want of jurisdiction. Part II 
examines the policy rationales behind these precedents. Finally, Part 
III argues that an adequate remedy exists outside of rule 41(e), render-
ing immediate appellate review of rulings on 41(e) motions 
unnecessary. 
I. IMMEDIATE APPEAL OF 41(E) MOTION RULINGS AND THE 
FINAL DECISION RULE 
Compliance with the final decision rule9 is a prerequisite to almost 
6. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Berry), 730 F.2d 716 (11th Cir. 1984); In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings (Uresti), 724 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1984); Standard Drywall, Inc. v. United States, 668 
F.2d 156 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982); Imperial Distribs., Inc. v. United States, 
617 F.2d 892 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC 
Corp.), 604 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1979); Church of Scientology v. United States, 591 F.2d 533 (9th 
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043 (1980). 
7. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Young), 716 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1983); Sovereign News Co. 
v. United States, 690 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814 (1983); United States v. 
One Residence & Attached Garage, 603 F.2d 1231 (7th Cir. 1979) (Wood, J., dissenting); Got-
tone v. United States, 345 F.2d 165 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 901 (1965). 
8. This Note concerns only appeals by movants whose 41(e) motions were denied. The fed· 
eral statute that specifies when the government can appeal district court orders in criminal cases 
explicitly allows the government to appeal orders granting 41(e) motions. This provision 
provides: 
An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision or order of 
a district courts [sic] suppressing or excluding evidence or requiring the return of seized 
property in a criminal proceeding, not made after the defendant has been put in jeopardy 
and before the verdict or finding on an indictment or information, if the United States attor-
ney certifies to the district court that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay and 
that the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding. 
18 u.s.c. § 3731 (1982). 
It is not unfair for courts to allow immediate government appeals of 41(e) motions that arc 
granted, while refusing to hear such appeals by unsuccessful movants. The reasons for permit-
ting the government to appeal a 41(e) motion that is granted do not apply to the situation in 
which a 4l(e) motion is denied. Specifically, the quoted section of § 3731 was designed to 
alleviate 
the harmful effects on the practice and development of the law of suppression growing out of 
the absence of a Government appeal. These evils include inconsistent rulings at the trial 
level; the development of the law of suppression rulings, which Congress rightly viewed as a 
rapidly changing area, at the District Court level, without the benefit of appellate review; 
and the dilemma of the prosecutor in choosing whether to follow what he believes to be an 
unwise limitation on the prosecution or defying it in the hope of convincing a second judge 
that the first was in error. 
United States v. Greely, 413 F.2d 1103, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Since a convicted criminal de-
fendant is guaranteed the right to appeal a district court suppression decision, these policies 
favoring immediate appeals by the government are inapplicable. 
9. This rule, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982), reads: "The courts of appeals (other than 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals 
from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, .•. except where a direct review 
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all federal appellate jurisdiction.10 This rule requires that courts of 
appeals dismiss for want of jurisdiction any appeal of a district court 
ruling that is not a "final decision." 11 In the criminal context, sentenc-
may be had in the Supreme Court." The final decision rule dates back to the Judiciary Act of 
1789, 1 Stat. 73, 83-85, which essentially codified the common law. DiBella v. United States, 369 
U.S. 121, 124 (1962). For a historical perspective on the final decision rule, see generally Crick, 
The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539 (1932). 
Although the final decision rule applies in both civil and criminal contexts, it is more rigor-
ously applied in criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 853-54 
(1978); DiBel/a, 369 U.S. at 126; c. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. CoOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE§ 3918, at 630 (1976) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT]. Strict adherence to the 
rule prevents delay in the criminal justice system. See note 59 infra and accompanying text. 
10. The only general statutory exceptions to the final decision rule are those specified in 28 
U.S.C. § 1292 (1982). These exceptions give the courts of appeals interlocutory jurisdiction over 
district court decisions in cases involving injunctions or orders appointing receivers, and in admi-
ralty cases. The statutory exceptions do not apply to motions made under rule 4l(e). See Impe-
rial Distribs., Inc. v. United States, 617 F.2d 892, 894 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891 
(1980); see also WRIGHT, supra note 9, § 3918, at 630 (these exceptions are generally not applica-
ble in criminal cases). 
There are also two judicially created exceptions to the final decision rule. The first concerns 
cases in which denial of immediate appeal causes irreparable harm to the movant. The Supreme 
Court has employed this exception only where the movant's rights would be completely lost if 
the Court did not permit immediate appeal. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) 
(protection against double jeopardy would be lost if interlocutory review of district court's deci-
sion refusing to quash indictment were not allowed, since the defendant would otherwise have to 
stand trial for a second time on the same charge); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (protection 
against excessive bail lost if immediate appeal of bail decision is not permitted). Since a defen-
dant may renew her 41(e) motion at trial (see notes 65-67 infra and accompanying text), a pre-
indictment ruling on a 41(e) motion is not a conclusive decision. No comparable irreparable 
harm results from the denial of interlocutory appeal of preindictment 4l(e) motions. See notes 
68-76 infra and accompanying text. 
In addition to the irreparable harm exception, the Supreme Court recognizes an exception to 
the final decision rule for district court orders which settle issues completely collateral to the 
case's primary concern. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) 
(exempting from the final decision rule orders which "fall into that small class which finally 
determine claims of right separate from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too im-
portant to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate 
consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated"). Courts have not enlarged this 
"small class." For example, a person cannot appeal an order denying a motion to quash a sub-
poena duces tecum. After all, it is argued, the person so ordered retains the option ofrefusing to 
produce the evidence and appealing the judge's contempt citation. Given the availability of this 
mechanism, the district court's decision cannot be considered to determine conclusively the mat-
ter. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 327 (1940). Thus, the collateral order exception 
remains quite limited in scope. 
The 4l(e) motion does not fit into this limited category of cases. This motion relates directly 
to the guilt or innocence of the movant since it contests the admissibility of the proof that the 
government will use in its attempt to get a conviction. The Supreme Court, citing DiBel/a, ex-
plicitly exempted rulings which would lead to the suppression of evidence from the collateral 
order exception. Abney, 431 U.S. at 659; accord Simons v. United States, 592 F.2d 251, 252 (5th 
Cir.) (retrieval feature of 41(e) motions is collateral to the case, but suppression aspect is not), 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 835 (1979); United States v. Glassman, 533 F.2d 262, 263 (5th Cir. 1976) 
(anything more than a motion asking solely for return of evidence is unappealable). 
11. Indeed, the appellate court is required to raise this issue sua sponte if it is not brought up 
by any of the parties. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 740 (1976); Local 
No. 438 Constr. & Gen. Laborers' Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542, 543 (1963); Collins v. Miller, 
252 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1920); In re Bassak, 705 F.2d 234, 236 (7th Cir. 1983); Pettinelli v. Danzig, 
644 F.2d 1160, 1161-62 (Sth Cir. 1981). An appeal ofa nonfinal decision must be dismissed even 
if both parties consent to appellate jurisdiction. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 
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ing represents the clearest illustration of a final decision.12 However, 
where an appellant contests a presentence decision, such as a ruling on 
a preindictment 41(e) motion, courts have struggled to determine the 
precise boundaries of the final decision rule. 
In DiBella v. United States, 13 a case involving a 41(e) motion, the 
Supreme Court directly addressed the question of whether a district 
court's ruling on a preindictment evidentiary motion was a final deci-
sion.14 In that case, although the movant had filed a 41(e) motion 
during the grand jury proceedings, he had been indicted by the time 
the district court denied the motion. 15 The Court held that, under the 
final decision rule, the court of appeals could not hear the defendant's 
appeal.16 Thus, DiBella requires a defendant to wait until after trial to 
appeal a postindictment denial of her preindictment 41(e) motion.17 
DiBella set up a two-part test for the appealability of rulings on 
preindictment evidentiary motions, including motions made pursuant 
to rule 41(e). The Court held that these rulings are "final" within the 
meaning of the final decision rule only if: (1) the motion is made 
solely for the return of the property seized and (2) the motion is not 
tied to a criminal prosecution "in esse. " 18 The Court found that the 
district court's ruling in DiBella, issued after the grand jury had in-
dicted the movant, satisfied neither of these elements. 19 The following 
sections analyze both elements of the DiBella test and conclude that 
U.S. 294, 305 (1962); Lowry & Co. v. S.S. Le Moyne D'Iberville, 372 F.2d 123, 123 (2d Cir. 
1967). 
12. See Corey v. United States, 375 U.S. 169, 174 (1963); Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 
211, 212 (1937). 
13. 369 U.S. 121 (1962). 
14. DiBel/a settled a conflict between the circuits on this issue. Compare United States v. 
Koenig, 290 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1961) (refusing to hold that a 41(e) motion brought before indict· 
ment, but decided after indictment, was a final decision), ajfd. sub nom. DiBella v. United States, 
369 U.S. 121 (1962), with Di Bella v. United States, 284 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1960) (holding a 
similar 41(e) motion immediately appealable), vacated, 369 U.S. 121 (1962). 
15. DiBel/a, 369 U.S. at 121-23. The order of these events is quite important. WhileDiBel/a 
resolved the cases with this sequence of events, this Note addresses the situation where not only 
the arguments on the motion, but also the court's decision on the motion and the appeal of that 
decision, occur before the grand jury indictment. 
16. In DiBe//a, the Court decided not only the case at hand, but also stated more broadly 
when appeals would lie from district court rulings on preindictment evidentiary motions: 
When at the time of ruling there is outstanding a complaint, or a detention or release on bail 
following arrest, or an arraignment, information, or indictment - in each such case the 
order on a suppression motion must be treated as "but a step in the criminal case prelimi· 
nary to the trial thereof." . . . Only if the motion is solely for the return of property and is 
in no way tied to a criminal prosecution in esse against the movant can the proceedings be 
regarded as independent. 
369 U.S. at 131-32. 
17. The same conclusion has been reached where the indictment followed the district court 
order, but preceded the filing of briefs with the court of appeals. See In re Search Warrants 
(Trupiano), 750 F.2d 664, 668 (8th Cir. 1984). 
18. See note 17 supra. 
19. 369 U.S. at 132. 
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the absence of an indictment against the movant should not change 
the outcome of either element. 
A. Motions Solely for the Return of Proper!)' 
A movant under rule 4l(e) must request both suppression and re-
turn of seized evidence.20 It is not possible to move "solely" to re-
trieve property under 41(e).21 Thus, the "solely for the return of 
property" test22 should always preclude interlocutory appeal of any 
41(e) motion.23 · 
In order to avoid this automatic bar against interlocutory appeal of 
41(e) rulings, some courts find that the "solely for the return of prop-
erty" test is met if the "primary purpose" of the motion is to regain 
the seized property.24 However, to read a primary purpose test into 
DiBella distorts the plain language of the opinion. Even if one strains 
to interpret the DiBella test this way, a primary purpose test should 
not allow interlocutory appeal of preindictment 41(e) rulings. A mov-
ant's claim that the primary purpose of her 41(e) motion is retrieval is, 
at the least, suspect. 25 Equitable motions exist that seek only the re-
turn of evidence and not its suppression. 26 Any movant whose true 
20. See note 3 supra and accompanying text. 
21. See, e.g., In re Search Warrants (frupiano), 750 F.2d 664, 667 (8th Cir. 1984); In re 
Grand Jury Proceedings (Young), 716 F.2d 493, 495 (8th Cir. 1983). The only exception is 
where a grand jury has not been empaneled at the time of the appeal, or a previously existing 
grand jury has adjourned. See Angel-Torres v. United States, 712 F.2d 717, 719 (1st Cir. 1983) 
(the empaneling of a grand jury makes the criminal proceeding accusatory and not simply inves-
tigatory, making interlocutory appeal presumptively unavailable); Standard Drywall, Inc. v. 
United States, 668 F.2d 156, 158 (2d Cir.) (the possibility of adjournment of the grand jury 
without the issuance of an indictment, which would make a motion for return of seized goods 
available, also makes immediate appeal impossible), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982). For fur-
ther discussion on the impact of the empaneling of a grand jury on the appealability of 41(e) 
motions, see note 76 infra. 
22. DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 131-32 (1962). 
23. That the drafters of rule 41(e) desired such a result can be inferred from their decision, in 
altering the rule in 1972 (after the DiBel/a decision), to continue its automatic suppression fea-
ture. The drafters were certainly aware of the "solely for the return of property" language in 
DiBella, yet they chose not to allow 41(e) motions to be made simply for the retrieval of prop-
erty. One can infer that by doing so they intended that no 41(e) motion be the subject of interloc-
utory appeal. 
24. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Young), 716 F.2d 493, 495 (8th Cir. 1983); 
Imperial Distribs., Inc. v. United States, 617 F.2d 892, 895 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 u:s. 891 
(1980); Shea v. Gabriel, 520 F.2d 879, 881 (1st Cir. 1975). 
25. See United States v. The Residence of Nicholas Furnia, 707 F.2d 82, 84 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(suggesting that motions under rule 41(e) cannot be considered solely for the return of evidence 
since they automatically suppress); Standard Drywall, Inc. v. United States, 668 F.2d 156, 158 
(2d Cir.) (omitting references to suppression in court papers does not eliminate this aspect of the 
motion; interlocutory review still unavailable), cert denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982); Imperial Dis-
tribs., Inc. v. United States, 617 F.2d 892, 895 (1st Cir.) (despite caption suggesting only return 
was being requested, the motion was one under rule 41(e) and was hence not solely for the return 
of property), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980). 
26. See notes 81-90 infra and accompanying text. 
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primary purpose is return of the evidence, rather than suppression27 or 
delay,28 could utilize such alternative procedures.29 Thus, no matter 
how a movant characterizes her reasons for bringing a 41(e) motion, 
suppression is certainly a strong motivation.30 DiBella's first test, 
then, does not allow immediate appeal of preindictment rulings on 
41(e) motions.31 
B. Motions Not Tied to an Ongoing Criminal Prosecution 
Other circuits, intent on claiming jurisdiction over pretrial appeals 
of 41(e) rulings, choose to ignore32 or reject33 the first element of the 
27. See Imperial Distribs., Inc. v. United States, 617 F.2d 892, 895 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 891 (1980). 
28. There is a legitimate fear that defendants will make 4l(e) motions only to slow the grand 
jury's investigation. See Imperial Distribs., Inc. v. United States, 617 F.2d 892, 896 (1st Cir.), 
cerL denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980). Since speed is critical to the criminal justice system, the 
Supreme Court emphasizes that such delay must be avoided. DiBella, 369 U.S. at 126; see notes 
47-57 infra and accompanying text. 
29. The resolution of these equitable motions involves weighing the government's and the 
movant's needs for the evidence. If the movant's need for the evidence is truly great, it will most 
likely outweigh the government's reasons for holding the materials. In such cases, a court will 
return the evidence. See note 85 infra. 
30. See Imperial Distribs., Inc. v. United States, 617 F.2d 892, 895 (1st Cir.) (despite mo-
tion's failure t~ mention suppression, court concludes that it is primarily directed at suppression, 
not return of the evidence), cerL denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980); United States v. One Residence & 
Attached Garage, 603 F.2d 1231, 1238 (7th Cir. 1979) (Wood, J., dissenting) (Unlike equitable 
return actions seeking only the return of evidence, 41(e) motions automatically suppress evidence 
and thus are unappealable even where the motion does not specifically mention suppression.); 
Parrish v. United States, 376 F.2d 601, 603 (4th Cir. 1967) (Boreman, J., concurring) (arguing 
that a 4l(e) motion was not made solely for the return of property and that an independent 
action that asked simply for return would be needed to allow immediate appeal). 
31. This assumes that an active grand jury exists. Where no grand jury has been empaneled 
or where an existing one has adjourned, interlocutory appeal is available. See Angel-Torres v. 
United States, 712 F.2d 717, 719 (1st Cir. 1983). For further examination of the impact of an 
active grand jury on a 4l(e) motion's appealability, see note 76 infra. 
32. See, e.g., Sovereign News Co. v. United States, 690 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 
464 U.S. 814 (1983); United States v. One Residence & Attached Garage, 603 F.2d 1231 (7th 
Cir. 1979); Coury v. United States, 426 F.2d 1354 (6th Cir. 1970). 
33. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 428 F.2d 1169 (8th Cir. 1970). The Eighth Circuit 
pointed out that in an earlier Supreme Court case, Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394 (1957), 
the Court had, in a footnote, stated that "(w]e do not suggest that a motion under Rule 4l(e) 
gains or loses appealability simply upon whether it asks for return or suppression or both." 354 
U.S. at 404 n.17. DiBella cited the Carroll footnote with approval. DiBel/a, 369 U.S. at 132. 
The Eighth Circuit asserted that 
[a] literal reading of the DiBel/a decision indicates that the proceeding be solely for the 
return of the property, as well as being independent of a criminal prosecution. However, 
such a reading of DiBella seems inconsistent with footnote 17 of the Carroll opinion •••• We 
adhere to the principles enunciated in that note in interpreting the DiBella decision. 
Alexander, 428 F.2d at 1171 n.3. 
The Eighth Circuit's argument, however, is unconvincing. The Carroll footnote does not con-
sider all of the factors that the Court deemed important in DiBel/a, which was decided five years 
after Carroll Indeed, the Court's discussion in Carroll did not relate to DiBel/a's first test at all, 
as seen in its suggestion in the same footnote that a court should consider "the 'essential charac-
ter and the circumstances under which it is made' [in order to] determine whether a motion is an 
independent proceeding or merely a step in the criminal case." Carroll, 354 U.S. at 404 n.17 
(quoting Cogen v. United States, 278 U.S. 221, 225 (1929)). It is this sentiment which DiBella 
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DiBe/la test. Yet DiBe/la's second element, which allows immediate 
appeal only if the motion is "in no way tied to a criminal prosecution 
in esse against the movant,"34 is also a formidable obstacle to appeal. 
DiBella states unambiguously that 41(e) motions that are made, de-
nied, and appealed before indictment do not meet the second prong of 
the test. In dicta, the Court stated that "[p ]resentations . . . before a 
grand jury ... are [part] of the federal prosecutorial system leading to 
a criminal trial. Orders granting or denying suppression in the wake of 
such proceedings are truly interlocutory, for the criminal trial is then 
fairly in train."35 
DiBella's narrowly phrased holding, however, did not reflect the 
Court's resolve on this issue. The Court explicitly denied interlocu-
tory review of rulings on 41(e) motions only where "there is outstand-
ing a complaint, or a detention or release on bail following arrest, or 
an arraignment, information, or indictment."36 The courts of appeals 
have clashed over whether the Court's dicta suggests that DiBella's 
holding would prevent appeal of preindictment 41(e) rulings.37 
Prior Supreme Court decisions contain guidance for resolving this 
dispute. These cases make clear that a criminal prosecution does in-
deed begin prior to indictment. In Cobbledick v. United States, 38 Jus-
tice Frankfurter concluded that grand jury hearings constitute judicial 
inquiries. 39 Much earlier, in Cogen v. United States, 40 the Court estab-
lished a test to determine if pretrial evidentiary motions are indeed 
independent proceedings. This test looks to the "essential character 
and the circumstances under which [the motion] is made [to] deter-
mine whether it is an independent proceeding or merely a step in the 
trial of the criminal case."41 Part of the "essential character" of a 
41 ( e) motion is to suppress evidence that could be used against the 
movant in a criminal trial.42 Since the Court has ruled that suppres-
cites with approval in enunciating its second test. DiBel/a explicitly bases the appealability of a 
preindictment 4l(e) motion on whether it requests return or suppression or both. Thus, the 
Eighth Circuit's language in Alexander is highly suspect. 
34. DiBe/la, 369 U.S. at 132. ''In esse" is defined to mean "[a]live; living; in being." BAL-
LENTINE's LAW DICTIONARY 617 (3d ed. 1969). 
35. 369 U.S. at 131. 
36. 369 U.S. at 131. 
37. Compare In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Young), 716 F.2d 493, 496 (8th Cir. 1983) (a 
criminal proceeding in esse begins at the time of arrest or arraignment), with Imperial Distribs., 
Inc. v. United States, 617 F.2d 892, 894-96 (1st Cir.) (concluding that DiBella denies appellate 
jurisdiction before indictment assuming the primary purpose of the 4l(e) motion is to suppress), 
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980). 
38. 309 U.S. 323 (1940). 
39. 309 U.S. at 327. 
40. 278 U.S. 221 (1929). 
41. 278 U.S. at 225. The Court also used this test in Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 
404 n.17 (1957), decided only five years before DiBella. 
42. See United States v. The Residence of Nicholas Furina, 707 F.2d 82, 84 (3d Cir. 1983); 
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 806, 807 (3d Cir. 1979). 
1762 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:1755 
sion motions can "vitally affect" the outcome of a criminal case, 43 a 
41(e) motion is not fully independent of the criminal prosecution.44 
Thus, a broad reading of DiBe/la, consistent with its dicta, properly 
prohibits interlocutory appeals of preindictment 41(e) motions.45 
II. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Refusing to allow interlocutory appeals of 41(e) rulings best serves 
the policy objectives underlying the grand jury system, the final deci-
sion rule, and rule 41(e). Allowing such appeals, on the other hand, 
would impose burdensome and unnecessary costs on the criminal jus-
tice system. 
43. Cogen v. United States, 278 U.S. 221, 223 (1929). 
44. See Smith v. United States, 377 F.2d 739, 742 (3d Cir. 1967) (holding that DiBella settles 
all cases involving preindictment 41(e) motions and refutes any suggestion that interlocutory 
appeal is allowed if no indictment has been returned); see also United States v. The Residence of 
Nicholas Furina, 707 F.2d 82, 84 (3d Cir. 1983) (the Third Circuit has always taken a broad view 
of what constitutes a criminal prosecution in eMe); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 
604 F.2d 806, 807 (3d Cir. 1979) (the possibility of a criminal prosecution is enough to make 
interlocutory appeal unavailable). 
45. Certain courts, choosing not to rely exclusively on DiBella's dicta, have instead charac-
terized DiBella's second test as one which asks whether the criminal process had shifted at the 
time of the making of the motion from the investigatory to the accusatory stage. See, e.g., Angel-
Torres v. United States, 712 F.2d 717, 719 (1st Cir. 1983); Sovereign News Co. v. United States, 
690 F.2d 569, 571 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814 (1983); United States v. One Resi-
dence & Attached Garage, 603 F.2d 1231, 1235 (7th Cir. 1979) (Swygert, J., concurring); Shea v. 
Gabriel, 520 F.2d 879, 882 (1st Cir. 1975). 
This shift has been used in recent cases to mark the time at which a defendant's sixth amend-
ment right to counsel begins. See, e.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972) (plurality 
opinion of four justices with one additional justice concurring in the result) ("The initiation of 
judicial criminal proceedings is •.. the starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal 
justice. . . . It is this point, therefore, that marks the commencement of the 'criminal prosecu-
tions' to which alone the explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are applicable.") (footnote 
omitted). It is clear that the right to counsel begins when a "critical step" (including arraign-
ment or indictment) in the criminal justice process has occurred. E.g., United States v. Wade, 
388 U.S. 218, 224-25 (1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1967). Since this Note 
applies only to cases in which there has been no arrest, arraignment, or indictment, it is clear 
that, in many cases within its scope, the right to counsel had not yet attached. Thus, if the sixth 
amendment test is used, an independent criminal proceeding exists at this time and interlocutory 
appeal may prove available. 
DiBel/a, however, makes clear that, for the purposes of determining the availability of inter-
locutory appeal, the independence of a hearing from a "criminal prosecution in esse" does not 
depend on the attachment of the right to counsel. The Court specifically stated that "the mere 
circumstance of a pre-indictment motion does not transmute the ensuing evidentiary ruling into 
an independent proceeding begetting finality even for purposes of appealability." DiBe/la, 369 
U.S. at 131. Thus, the "mere circumstance" of the failure of the defendant's sixth amendment 
right to attach cannot be enough to make the ruling independent for the purposes of interlocu-
tory appeal, and the sixth amendment test cannot be the one the court intended to be used. 
Indeed, DiBel/a makes clear that even if there is only a possibility that the movant may be 
brought to trial, courts should view 41(e) motions as being tied to an active criminal prosecution. 
See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Berry), 730 F.2d 716, 718 (11th Cir. 1984); Jn re Grand Jury 
Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 806, 807 (3d Cir. 1979). Thus, the accusatory stage of the 
prosecution begins as soon as evidence is presented to an empaneled grand jury. See Angel-
Torres v. United States, 712 F.2d 717, 719 (1st Cir. 1983). 
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A. Impact of Interlocutory Appeal of 41(e) Motions on the Grand 
Jury Process 
Allowing a movant to appeal a 41(e) ruling in the midst of a grand 
jury investigation would adversely affect the grand jury process as a 
whole. While rule 4l(e) allows some delay by requiring a court to 
hold an initial hearing on the motion, permitting an immediate and 
lengthy appeal of the court's ruling would interfere with the grand 
jury system to an unwarranted degree.46 Allowing interlocutory ap-
peal gives defense attorneys too much opportunity to stall criminal 
proceedings.47 The Supreme Court has noted several reasons why 
courts must scrupulously avoid delay of grand jury proceedings.48 
First, delay hampers a grand jury's ability to fulfill its goal of fully 
investigating those people it suspects of criminal activity.49 Second, 
because the grand jury plays such a critical role in the criminal justice 
system, the Court has noted that safeguarding a grand jury's investiga-
tion against delay is just as important as protecting the progress of a 
trial from undue interruption. 50 Indeed, the Court has linked freedom 
from delay at the grand jury stage of a criminal prosecution with the 
constitutional right to a speedy trial.51 Finally, delay decreases the 
government's ability to gain an indictment and conviction, because it 
jeopardizes the availability of necessary evidence. 52 
Furthermore, the benefits of allowing immediate appeal of 41 ( e) 
motions do not outweigh these high costs. Of course, the right to ap-
peal denials of -41 ( e) motions could protect some defendants against 
the burden of standing trial, since suppression could lead to dismissal 
by the court or a prosecution decision not to proceed with the case. 53 
However, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Calandra, 54 explic-
itly held that this harm does not outweigh the danger that delay 
46. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Berry), 730 F.2d 716, 718 (11th Cir. 1984); Standard 
Drywall, Inc. v. United States, 668 F.2d 156, 158 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982); see 
also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-50 (1974) (interrupting grand jury proceedings 
for evidentiary rulings would damage the criminal justice system); Gelbard v. United States, 408 
U.S. 41, 70 (1972) (White, J., concurring) ("protracted interruptions of grand jury proceedings" 
are to be avoided); DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 129 (1962) (allowing appeals of pre-
indictment evidentiary motions, with their attendant stays, disrupts the criminal justice system). 
47. DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 129 (1962). 
48. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-52 (1974). 
49. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-50 (1974); see Cobbledick v. United States, 
309 U.S. 323, 327 (1940). Such delay also has detrimental effects on any subsequent trial. See 
United States v. Premises Known as 608 Taylor Ave., 584 F.2d 1297, 1301 (3d Cir. 1978). 
50. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 327 (1940). Indeed, the grand jury is allowed 
to operate unfettered by the technical rules of criminal procedure. See note 56 infra and accom-
panying text. 
51. See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. at 327. DiBella v. United States also mentions 
this constitutional safeguard. 369 U.S. 121, 126 (1962). 
52. DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 129 (1962). 
53. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351 (1974). 
54. 414 U.S. 338 (1974). 
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presents to the grand jury system. 55 The Court indicated that facilitat-
ing speedy grand jury proceedings was important enough to allow 
grand juries to issue indictments on the basis of illegally seized evi-
dence. 56 The Court decided that a criminal defendant's opportunity to 
object to the admission of illegally seized evidence at trial is sufficient 
to vindicate the defendant's fourth amendment rights. 57 Thus, be-
cause a 41(e) movant has a right to raise the suppression issue again at 
trial, there is no need to allow interlocutory appeal of a preindictment 
41(e) ruling. 
B. Impact of Interlocutory Appeal of 41 (e) Motions on the Policies 
Underlying the Final Decision Rule 
According to the Supreme Court, Congress enacted the final deci-
sion rule to promote and maintain a speedy and efficient judicial sys-
tem. 58 The guarantees of the Constitution and the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure give special importance to these policies in crimi-
nal cases. 59 In DiBel/a, the Court held that allowing interlocutory ap-
peal of a postindictment ruling on a 41(e) motion would interfere with 
the smooth and efficient running of the criminal justice system. 60 The 
same reasoning applies when a motion is denied before a grand jury 
returns an indictment against the movant. 
55. 414 U.S. at 349-52. For a further discussion of the Court's refusal to remedy such "un-
justified" trials, see note 66 infra. 
56. 414 U.S. at 345 ("[A]n indictment valid on its face is not subject to challenge on the 
ground that the grand jury acted on the basis of inadequate or incompetent evidence ••• or even 
on the basis of information obtained in violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination •..• "). 
57. See 414 U.S. at 351 (the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect is based on the inadmissibility 
of evidence at trial). 
58. See DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 124 (1962) (The final decision rule avoids 
"undue litigiousness and leaden-footed administration of justice."). 
59. See, e.g., United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 265 (1982); United 
States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 853-54 (1978); DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 124 
(1962); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940). 
Historically, appeals in criminal cases, even of truly final decisions, have been discouraged. 
Indeed, until 1889, an appeal as of right was not recognized in criminal cases. Even when the 
first statute was passed allowing appellate review of criminal convictions, it dealt only with those 
defendants convicted of capital offenses; a general right to appeal did not exist until 1911. See 
Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 & n.3. Certainly this history has had the effect of 
chilling interlocutory appeal in this area, as courts attempt to avoid "the delays and disruptions 
attendant upon immediate appeal [which] are especially inimical to the effective and fair adminis-
tration of the criminal law." DiBe/la, 369 U.S. at 126. 
The policy is also reflected in rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states 
that the rules are to "be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration 
and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay." FED. R. CRIM. P. 2 (emphasis added); 
see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 50(a) (preference to criminal cases on district court dockets); FED. R. 
APP. P. 45(b) (preference to criminal cases on court of appeals dockets). In fact, efficiency is 
such an important goal in criminal justice that district court orders denying motions to dismiss 
on the basis of breach of the defendant's right to a speedy trial cannot be reviewed until after 
conviction. See MacDonald, 435 U.S. at 857 (such an order "obviously is not final"). 
60. DiBella, 369 U.S. at 129. 
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Interlocutory appeal fosters inefficiency in three ways. First, as 
noted above, it causes unnecessary delay. 61 Second, whether a court 
denies the 41(e) motion before or after indictment, allowing immediate 
appeal encourages piecemeal review. 62 An appellate court is more 
likely to issue an incorrect decision on an interlocutory appeal, since 
the abbreviated record will not yet contain all the facts of the case. 63 
Allowing appeal only after trial avoids this problem, thereby fostering 
efficiency. 64 
Finally, the authority of the district court to reconsider the sup-
pression issue at trial exacerbates the inefficiency of allowing interlocu-
tory appeal. All movants whose pretrial 41(e) motions fail have the 
right to raise the suppression issue again at trial. 65 Thus, the judge 
closest to the case gets another chance to examine the legality of the 
seizure of the challenged evidence. With more facts available, the 
judge could change her earlier decision and agree to suppress the evi-
dence. 66 This "second chance" removes the required finality from the 
district court's first decision, making interlocutory appeal im-
permissible. 67 
C. Impact of Interlocutory Appeal of 4J(e) Motions upon the 
Policies Underlying Rule 41 (e) 
Because rule 41 ( e) codifies the protections of the exclusionary 
rule, 68 the same policy goals motivate both rules. 69 The Supreme 
61. See notes 46-52 supra and accompanying text. 
62. See Standard Drywall, Inc. v. United States, 668 F.2d 156, 158 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 456 
U.S. 927 (1982); Imperial Distribs., Inc. v. United States, 617 F.2d 892, 894 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980). 
63. The same pitfalls that endanger the trial court's decision at this stage affect the court of 
appeals. For a consideration of these· disadvantages, see note 66 infra. 
64. See In re Milburne, 77 F.2d 310, 311 (2d Cir. 1935) (noting that trials bring more facts to 
light, allowing for better decisions on evidentiary motions). 
65. See, e.g., DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 130 n.9 (1962) ("[T]he District Courts 
will wish to reserve final ruling until the criminal trial."); United States v. Woodson, 490 F.2d 
1282, 1283 (9th Cir. 1973). 
66. See, e.g., DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 129 & n.9 (1962) ("[A]ppellate interven-
tion makes for [a] truncated presentation ... because the legality of the search too often cannot 
truly be determined until the evidence at trial has brought all circumstances to light." The Court 
noted that "the usual procedure followed at [the preindictment] stage is to decide the question on 
affidavits alone."); McRae v. United States, 420 F.2d 1283, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (new facts 
developed at trial may cast doubt on pretrial suppression orders); Rouse v. United States, 359 
F.2d 1014, 1015-16 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (same); Grant v. United States, 291 F.2d 227, 229 (2d Cir. 
1961) (same); In re Milburne, 77 F.2d 310, 311 (2d Cir. 1935) ("[l]t is impossible to make an 
intelligent disposition of [an evidentiary] motion until the trial, when all the facts and circum-
stances can be brought to light."). 
67. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Sweet Music, S.A., 482 F.2d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 1973) (the final deci-
sion rule prevents interlocutory appeal of decision that the trial court could itself change). 
68. See note 2 supra. 
69. Rule 4l(e) was designed to codify the holdings of earlier cases such as Gouled v. United 
States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), and Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), which relied on the 
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Court intended the exclusionary rule to effectuate the protections of 
the fourth amendment.70 Neither the exclusionary rule nor rule 41(e) 
was intended to compensate a victim of an illegal search or seizure for 
any injury she sustained.71 Instead, the goal of the exclusionary rule is 
to deter unlawful police conduct. 72 
fourth amendment. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee note. It is unclear, however, 
whether the exclusionary rule is required by the fourth amendment. See note 70 infra. 
70. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). The Supreme Court relied on 
the fourth amendment in adopting the exclusionary rule for federal criminal cases in Weeks v. 
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). State courts have also been required to follow the exclusion-
ary rule since the Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). At that time, it seemed 
clear that the exclusionary rule was required by the Constitution. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655 
(Justice Clark, in an opinion joined by four other justices, stated: "We hold that all evidence 
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, 
inadmissible in a state court.") (emphasis added). But see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484 
n.21 (1976) (claiming that only four justices adopted this view in Mapp). 
Since Mapp, however, the opinion of the Court appears to have shifted. A majority agreed in 
Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348, that the exclusionary rule was merely a "judicially created remedy." 
See also Stone, 428 U.S. at 495 n.37 (reaffirming that the exclusionary rule is a "judicially created 
remedy rather than a personal constitutional right"). The Court reiterated this view recently in 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), where Justice White's majority opinion states that 
"the Fourth Amendment 'has never been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of itlegally 
seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.' " 468 U.S. at 906 (quoting Stone, 428 
U.S. at 486). This position has been attacked by commentators who stress that the origins of the 
exclusionary rule are constitutional. See, e.g., Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary 
Rule Rest On A ''Principled Basis" Rather Than An "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. 
REv. 565, 598-600 (1983). 
71. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). 
72. A majority of justices on the Court has not always agreed that such deterrence is the 
primary objective of the exclusionary rule. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659-60 (1961), and 
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1960), the Court, after discussing deterrence, also 
mentioned that if judicial integrity were to be maintained, convictions could not be obtained 
using the fruits of unconstitutional searches and seizures. In Mapp, the Court concluded that the 
exclusionary rule guarantees the "judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of 
justice." 367 U.S. at 660. 
The shift in focus away from judicial integrity began in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 
338 (1974) (relying solely on the deterrence rationale in holding the exclusionary rule inapplica-
ble at grand jury hearings), and continued in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976), where 
the Court stated that the judicial integrity justification for the exclusionary rule had only a "lim-
ited role" to play. Thus, the Court concluded, "[t]he primary justification for the exclusionary 
rule .•. is the deterrence of police conduct that violates Fourth Amendment rights." 428 U.S. at 
486. This is now the view of a majority of the Court. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 
(1984) (mentioning only deterrence as a basis for the rule and failing to discuss the impact of the 
newly created "reasonable mistake" exception on judicial integrity). 
In his dissents to both Calandra and Leon, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, has 
sharply objected to the majority's conclusion regarding the purposes of the exclusionary rule. 
See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 356 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the majority's position represents a 
"startling misconception" of the purposes of the exclusionary rule); Leo11, 468 U.S. at 932 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) ("The judiciary is responsible, no less than the executive, for ensuring that 
constitutional rights are respected."). Commentators have also disagreed with the majority's 
position. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 70, at 597-606 (arguing that the Court is incorrectly 
ignoring judicial integrity); Mertens & Wasserstrom, Eleventh Annual Review of Crimillal Proce-
dure - Foreword: The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulati11g the Police 
and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 385 (1981) (calling Calandra's reasoning "question-
able"); Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Co11stit11tio11a/ Re-
quirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251, 308 (1974) (arguing that while neither view is precisely 
correct, "Brennan at least points in the direction of a coherent position"). 
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Given this objective, the Court has held that the exclusionary rule 
does not apply at the grand jury stage of criminal proceedings. 73 The 
Court rejected the claim that suppression at the pretrial phase of a 
case is an effective deterrent to police misconduct.74 Like the Court's 
refusal to suppress illegally obtained evidence under the exqlusionary 
rule prior to indictment, 75 denying immediate review of preindictment 
rulings on 41(e) motions is consistent with the deterrence policy un-
derlying both suppression mechanisms. The protection afforded a 
criminal defendant by allowing her to raise the suppression issue again 
at trial sufficiently safeguards her constitutional rights. 76 Further-
more, if a movant is subsequently convicted, she has the right to ap-
peal the trial court's decision to admit challenged evidence.77 Thus, 
allowing immediate appeal of 41(e) motions does not serve one of the 
primary policy goals of rule 4l(e). 
73. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-50 (1974). 
74. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351 (1974) (It is "unrealistic" to expect an 
increase in deterrence if the exclusionary rule applies at this stage.); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 13-14 (1968) (the rule cannot deter police conduct where conviction is not at stake). 
75. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (allowing the grand jury to use 
illegally seized evidence as the basis of a criminal indictment). 
76. As noted above, denying immediate appellate review of 41(e) motions will force some 
defendants to stand trial on charges based on illegally seized evidence. This problem is not 
solved if the district court reverses its earlier evidentiary ruling at trial. In Calandra, the 
Supreme Court held that the danger of delay to the grand jury system outweighs any harm 
caused by forcing these defendants to stand trial. See notes 54-57 supra and accompanying text. 
Of course, even if they are eventually acquitted, some defendants may claim they were hurt 
by the grand jury's mere holding of the evidence. For example, the evidence could be required 
for business purposes. However, it is possible for this class of movant to make a separate motion 
that simply asks for return of the evidence, not its suppression. Therefore, any harm caused by 
the mere holding of the evidence can be attributed to the defendant's own failure to make the 
correct motion. See Parrish v. United States, 376 F.2d 601, 603 (4th Cir. 1967) (Boreman, J., 
concurring) (DiBe//a suggests to movants that they use these equitable motions). For further 
discussion on these equitable return motions, see notes 78-90 infra and accompanying text. 
The argument of these movants, however, is quite compelling in cases where the delay in the 
return of evidence caused by the 41(e) motion's denial seems indefinite. See United States v. 
Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971); Angel-Torres v. United States, 712 F.2d 717, 719 (1st Cir. 1983). 
Indeed, where no grand jury has been empaneled, immediate appeal is available, since there is no 
longer anything from which to suppress the evidence. In addition, since there is no grand jury, 
no criminal investigation has begun, and hence the 4l(e) motion is a wholly independent pro-
ceeding. See Angel-Torres, 712 F.2d at 719; see also Standard Drywall, Inc. v. United States, 668 
F.2d 156, 158-59 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982) (an actual or potential criminal case 
against the movant is all that is needed to deny interlocutory appeal). Standard Drywall also 
points out that if a grand jury adjourns without returning an indictment, a 41(e) motion by the 
defendant would be an independent proceeding. 668 F.2d at 158. 
Where a grand jury is currently sitting, delay is less of a concern, since it is limited, at most, 
to the length of the grand jury's term. See Angel-Torres, 712 F.2d at 720; Imperial Distribs., Inc. 
v. United States, 617 F.2d 892, 896 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980). The equitable 
motions mentioned above provide relief if even this period of delay would cause extreme harm to 
the movant. 
77. Sentencing is clearly a final decision. See note 12 supra and accompanying text. If any 
error is alleged which makes the conviction or sentence improper, appeal will lie under the final 
decision rule, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). See, e.g., Shea v. Gabriel, 520 F.2d 879, 881 (1st Cir. 
1975) (adequate chance for appellate review exists ifthe movant is later indicted and convicted). 
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III. EQUITABLE RETURN MOTIONS AS ALTERNATIVES TO 41(E) 
MOTIONS 
When the Supreme Court decided DiBe/la, it stated that appeals of 
preindictment evidentiary rulings should never be allowed where the 
motion was not made solely for the return of the property seized. 1s As 
Part I of this Note demonstrates, this sole-motive test may be impossi-
ble to meet in the context of 4l{e) motions, because 41(e) motions 
necessarily request both suppression and return of the seized evi-
dence. 79 However, a defendant may make a different motion, similar 
to that authorized by rule 41(e), that does satisfy the first part of 
DiBella,s test. so These alternative equitable motions request only the 
return, st not the suppression,82 of evidence. Under such a motion, a 
court may order the government to return evidence to the movant, 
and still allow the grand jury to keep copies of the evidence or to reex-
amine the original evidence at a later time. 83 
Because these equitable return motions seek only to retrieve evi-
dence, not to determine its admissibility at trial, the legality of the 
seizure in question is not at issue in these proceedings. 84 Instead, a 
court will deny an equitable return motion and permit the grand jury 
to hold the evidence only if the government's need to hold the evi-
dence outweighs the movant's interest in retrieving it.85 In this way, 
78. This is the first part of DiBella's two-part test. See notes 18-31 supra and accompanying 
text. 
79. See notes 24-31 supra and accompanying text. 
80. These motions, however, are not made under rule 41(e), but are instead directed to the 
district court's broad equitable powers. See, e.g., Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 
U.S. 344, 352-55 (1931) (district court has jurisdiction to hear equitable claim for return of evi-
dence); Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 29, 32 (5th Cir. 1974) (same), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 
(1975). 
81. See Imperial Distrib., Inc. v. United States, 617 F.2d 892, 896 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 891 (1980). 
82. See United States v. The Residence of Nicholas Furina, 707 F.2d 82, 84 (3d Cir. 1983); 
United States v. Premises Known as 608 Taylor Ave., 584 F.2d 1297, 1300 (3d Cir. 1978); see 
also Mr. Lucky Messenger Serv. v. United States, 587 F.2d 15, 17 (7th Cir. 1978). 
83. See United States v. Premises Known as 608 Taylor Ave., 584 F.2d 1297, 1301 (3d Cir. 
1978) (grand jury permitted to take and retain photographs of the cash seized). 
84. Evidence of the "circumstances" of the seizure is irrelevant if the only issue is whether 
the evidence should be returned. It is the suppression aspect of the 4l(e) motion that requires a 
showing of an illegal seizure. See Mr. Lucky Messenger Serv. v. United States, 587 F.2d 15, 17 
(7th Cir. 1978). 
85. See Mr. Lucky Messenger Serv. v. United States, 587 F.2d 15, 17 (7th Cir. 1978). The 
critical inquiry, from the court's perspective, is the government's justification for holding the 
material. As the length of time that the government holds the evidence increases, the harm to 
the movant also increases and the balance tips more heavily in favor of the movant. Also to be 
considered are the movant's interest in and need for the evidence, whether he would suffer irrepa-
rable harm if it were not returned, and the existence of an adequate remedy at law. Movants can 
argue that 4l(e) motions are not adequate remedies, since they require a showing of illegal 
seizure of evidence and since they are not immediately appealable. A consideration favoring the 
government is the goal of allowing the grand jury system to proceed unfettered. In addition, the 
government's right to conduct criminal investigations with some degree of secrecy is threatened 
if it must return evidence. See Shea v. Gabriel, 520 F.2d 879, 882 (1st Cir. 1975). 
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equitable return motions provide an adequate remedy for those who 
are injured by the grand jury's detention of their seized property. For 
such persons, the equitable motion provides a clear path to retrieve 
their property and allows them to choose a course which permits im-
mediate appellate review. 
In addition, because it is collateral to the issue of the movant's 
guilt or innocence, 86 a court's decision on one of these equitable mo-
tions is ripe for interlocutory review.87 Moreover, immediate review is 
necessary to safeguard the movant's rights. Unlike postconviction re-
view of 41(e) rulings, postconviction review of a denial of an equitable 
return motion is meaningless as it cannot protect the rights which a 
movant loses while the grand jury holds the evidence. 88 Thus, by 
changing her motion from one requesting return and suppression to 
one requesting simply return, a movant can ensure that she will be 
able to appeal immediately a court's refusal to return her property.89 
In this way, the availability of an equitable return motion solves many 
of the problems caused by the coupling of return and suppression 
under rule 41(e).9o 
CONCLUSION 
District court denial of preindictment motions made pursuant to 
rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should not be 
subject to interlocutory appeal. The final decision rule, which is 
strongest in the area of criminal law, prohibits this form of piecemeal 
review. Preindictment rulings on 41(e) motions fail to meet the 
Supreme Court's carefully crafted exceptions to the final decision rule. 
Furthermore, permitting immediate appeal of 41(e) rulings would 
cause pointless delay of the grand jury process. Because the availabil-
ity of equitable relief eliminates any harm a movant may suffer from 
the retention of evidence by the grand jury, there is good reason to 
interpret the Supreme Court's holding in DiBella to prohibit interlocu-
tory appeal of preindictment rulings on 41(e) motions. 
- Clifford A. Godiner 
86. See Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 403-04 (1957). 
87. See Mr. Lucky Messenger Serv. v. United States, 587 F.2d 15 (7th Cir. 1978); United 
States v. Premises Known as 608 Taylor Ave., 584 F.2d 1297 (3d Cir. 1978). 
88. See United States v. Premises Known as 608 Taylor Ave., 584 F.2d 1297, 1300-02 (3d 
Cir. 1978). 
89. See Shea v. Gabriel, 520 F.2d 879, 881-82 (1st Cir. 1975). 
90. Thus, equitable return motions provide movants with a choice of two paths: one that will 
win only return, but will proceed to appeal immediately, and one that can result in both suppres-
sion and return, but is limited to district court consideration until after conviction. 
